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 Abstract 
 
This paper evaluates cost and scale efficiencies of Switzerland’s regulated rural bus 
companies operating in regional networks. The adopted methodology can be used in 
benchmarking analyses applied to incentive regulation systems. Moreover, the 
estimations can be used to evaluate the bidding offers for the tendering processes 
predicted by the ongoing reform policies. Since these companies operate in different 
regions with various characteristics that are only partially observed, it is crucial for 
the regulator to distinguish between inefficiency and exogenous heterogeneity that 
influences the costs. A number of stochastic cost frontier models are applied to a 
panel of 94 companies over a 12-year period from 1986 to 1997. The main focus lies 
on the ability of these models to distinguish inefficiency from the unobserved firm-
specific heterogeneity in a network industry. The estimation results are compared and 
the effect of unobserved heterogeneity on inefficiency estimates is analyzed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In many European countries the regional public bus services are being 
reorganized. In line with the EU policy the Swiss government has introduced 
important regulatory reforms in the public transport system, including regional bus 
companies. The new policy act predicts a tendering process for the provision of 
regional bus services. With the implementation of the new system, the applying 
companies will bid in competitive auctions and the access rights will be granted to the 
company with the lowest subsidies request. This system is believed to introduce 
greater incentives for competitive behavior. However, given the limited number of 
bidding companies in most regions, it is not clear to what extent the new policies lead 
to efficient production. Moreover, the incumbents, mostly public companies, might 
have an advantageous position in such auctions. Benchmarking methods can be used 
to evaluate the requested subsidies and proposed costs by individual companies or to 
adjust the minimum bidding prices.  
Benchmarking analysis is based on comparing the costs of individual 
companies to the ‘best’ (most cost-efficient) observed practice. These deviations, 
often labeled as ‘cost-inefficiency’ can also be used to adjust the amount of subsidies 
paid to individual bus operators. Moreover, predicted costs of the benchmark practice 
could be used to gain information regarding the future evolution of costs incurred by 
the companies operating in a service area, and to re-evaluate the claimed subsidies.1  
In order to use the efficiency estimates of individual companies in regulation, 
it is important to have precise measurement methods. In particular, because of 
                                                 
1 See Farsi and Filippini (2004) for a discussion on the use of cost prediction in the regulation of public 
utilities. 
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considerable cost differences across various networks, it is crucial to distinguish the 
cost difference due to unobserved heterogeneity in external factors from the excess 
costs due to the company’s inefficiency. Benchmarking can be conducted using 
econometric methods such as stochastic frontier models, which have been developed 
in a variety of forms during the past two decades.2 All these models in one way or 
another separate the heterogeneity from cost-inefficiency. Especially, with panel data 
at hand, the unobserved heterogeneity can be better identified because the time-
invariant elements of heterogeneity can be separately specified by firm-specific 
effects.  
The first application of panel data models in stochastic frontier analysis was 
introduced by Pitt and Lee (1981). These authors formulated the firm-specific error 
component as a half-normal distribution, which they interpreted as inefficiency. In the 
following years, several models have been developed to incorporate the observed 
firm-specific heterogeneity. For instance, Jha and Singh (2001), Piacenza (2002) and 
Dalen and Gomez-Lobo (2003) use single equation models3 proposed by Battese and 
Coelli (1995) to incorporate some exogenous variables to explain the determinants of 
the inefficiency component in the bus transportation industry. However, most of these 
models have a shortcoming in that they cannot disentangle firm’s inefficiency from 
cost differences due to unobserved characteristics of the service area. Especially, 
transport companies operate in networks with different shapes and structures, which 
result in different coordination problems and thus lead to different costs. These 
characteristics are usually given and cannot be controlled by the companies. Some of 
these exogenous factors are either unavailable or too complex to be measured by 
                                                 
2 Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) provide an extensive survey of this literature.  
3 For the advantages of single stage models, see Wang and Schmidt (2002). 
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single indicators. Unfortunately, when unobserved heterogeneity is present the 
inefficiency estimates can be biased.  
Greene (2004, 2005) proposes alternative panel data models, which can better 
distinguish between unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity and inefficiency. These 
models extend the previous models by adding an additional stochastic error 
component for the heterogeneity.4 Such models are particularly useful in transport 
industries where the network and environmental characteristics are mostly unobserved 
or hard to measure, but play an important role on the operating costs.  
The purpose of this study is to analyze the performance of different panel data 
frontier models with regard to estimated coefficients, inefficiency scores and 
estimates of economies of scale and density. Especially, we focus on the ability of 
different models to distinguish unobserved heterogeneity from inefficiency. 
Alternative models are applied to a sample of 94 Swiss rural bus companies from 
1986 to 1997. It is concluded that in the studied sample, Greene’s “true” random 
effects model has a considerable advantage over other models in separating 
heterogeneity from inefficiency.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sections 2 and 3 present the 
model specification and the methodology respectively. The data are explained in 
section 4. Section 5 presents the estimation results and discusses their implications, 
and section 6 provides the conclusions.  
 
                                                 
4 A similar model but with a three-stage estimation procedure has been proposed by Kumbhakar (1991) 
and Heshmati and Kumbhakar (1994).  
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2. Model Specification 
 
A bus transit company can be considered as a production unit that operates in 
a given network and transforms labor and capital services and energy into units of 
transport services. Since in most cases not only the network but also the schedule of a 
bus operator is regulated and predetermined, it is common to estimate a cost rather 
than a production function.5 Different specifications have been used in the literature.6 
Often, output is measured in terms of either passenger- or seat-kilometers. To capture 
some of the heterogeneity of different service areas, most specifications include 
additional output characteristics such as the number of stops, network length or 
average commercial speed. Most of these studies also include a time trend to capture 
the potential changes in technology.  
The total cost frontier can therefore be written as the following function: 
 
 ( , , , , )L CTC f Y N P P t= , (1) 
 
where TC is the total annual cost and Y is the output represented by the total number 
of seat-kilometers. N represents the network length. PC and PL are respectively the 
capital and labor prices. We considered an alternative specification including energy 
prices. The estimated coefficients did not change significantly and the coefficient of 
the energy price was generally insignificant. Moreover, because of a number of 
missing values for energy costs a two-input model allows a larger sample. Therefore, 
                                                 
5 See Berechman (1993) for an overview of the application of cost functions in public transport. 
6 See among others Fazioli et al. (1993), Filippini and Prioni (1994, 2003), Matas and Raymond (1998), 
Fraquelli et al. (2001) and Fazioli et al. (2003).  
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we consider labor and capital as the main input factors. However, as we see later, the 
capital price is calculated from all non-labor expenses, thus includes the variations in 
energy prices. 
It is generally assumed that the cost function given in (1) is the result of cost 
minimization given input prices and output and should therefore satisfy certain 
properties namely, linear homogeneity and concavity in input prices and monotonicity 
in input prices and output.7 Input prices and output are assumed to be exogenous, thus 
beyond the firm’s control. In the case of Swiss bus transport companies, the 
municipalities and the cantons specify the output by regulating the frequency of the 
service. The input prices can also be regarded as given, because these companies have 
a relatively small share in the labor and capital markets, thus cannot influence the 
prices through monopsony.  
To estimate the cost function (1), a translog functional form is chosen. This 
flexible functional form is a local, second-order logarithmic approximation to any 
arbitrary twice-differentiable cost function. It places no a priori restrictions on the 
elasticity of substitution and allows the economies of scale to vary with the output 
level. The translog approximation to (1) is written as: 
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      with   i= 1, 2, ...., N   and    t = 1,2,…,T, 
                                                 
7 For more details on the properties of the cost function, see Chambers (1988), p. 52. 
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where subscripts i and t denote the company and year respectively. The technical 
change is specified as a linear trend and is assumed to be neutral with respect to cost 
minimizing input ratios.8 The translog form requires that the underlying cost function 
be approximated around a specific point like the sample mean or median. Here, the 
sample median is chosen because it is less affected by outliers and thus the 
approximation will have better precision. As can be seen in equation (2), linear 
homogeneity in input prices is imposed by dividing total costs and input prices by 
labor price. The other theoretical restrictions are verified after the estimation.  
Apart from estimating cost inefficiency, the estimation of a cost function 
enables us to derive important characteristics of bus supply technology such as 
economies of density and scale. The distinction between scale and density economies 
is particularly important in network industries. In such cases, a company’s size is 
related to both its output level and its network size, which do not necessarily vary 
with a simple one-to-one relationship. For this reason it is important to distinguish 
cost changes that occur uniquely because of output changes within a fixed network 
and cost changes resulting from a proportional change in both network and output. 
Economies of density are defined as the inverse of the elasticity of costs with 
respect to output that is, the relative increase in total cost resulting from an increase in 
output, holding all input prices and the network size fixed:9 
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8 In other words the technical change does not alter the optimal input bundles. 
9 See also Caves, Christensen and Tretheway (1984). 
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The existence of economies of density implies that the average costs of a bus 
operator decrease as physical output increases. Economies of density exist if the 
above expression (ED) has a value greater than one. For values of ED below one, we 
identify diseconomies of density. In the case of ED = 1, the company’s output 
minimizes its average costs given the network’s size.  
Slightly different is the definition of economies of scale (ES). Here, the 
increase in total costs is brought about by an increase in company’s scale that is in 
both output and the network size, holding the factor prices constant. However, since 
the changes in output and network size are inter-related, the definition of scale 
economies requires an assumption in this respect. The commonly used definition is 
the one proposed by Caves, Christensen and Tretheway (1984), which assumes that 
any increase in size raises the network size and the outputs with the same proportion. 
Based on this assumption, ES is defined as: 
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Similarly, economies of scale exist if ES is higher than 1.  
It should be noted that the above definitions of scale and density economies 
are in terms of cost elasticity and do not necessarily correspond to the definitions 
derived from the production function. In fact, only in homothetic production 
functions, where the optimal input bundles vary proportionately, the two definitions 
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are equivalent. Here, we do not impose such an assumption. However, as in this paper 
we are interested in the cost effects of output, we define the scale and density 
economies as the inverse of the corresponding cost elasticities.10 
 
3. Methodology 
 
The effects of unobserved heterogeneity on inefficiency estimates are studied 
by a comparative analysis of four econometric models. These models are a pooled 
cross section model in line with Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977); a random effects 
model as in Pitt and Lee (1981); a fixed effects model as in Schmidt and Sickles 
(1984); and a random intercept frontier model (also known as “true” random effects 
model) proposed by Greene (2004, 2005). The deterministic part of all models is 
based on the specification given in equation (2). 
Model I (Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt, 1977) is a pooled frontier model, in 
which the error term is divided into two components: a normally distributed error vit, 
capturing general measurement errors and heterogeneity and a half-normal random 
term uit, representing the inefficiency as a one-sided non-negative disturbance This 
model can be written as: 
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0α + itx' β  represents the deterministic part of the cost function as in equation (2), and 
2(0, )uN σ+  stands for the positive part of a normal distribution. Both error 
components are assumed to be uncorrelated with each other and the regressors. This 
                                                 
10 See Chambers (1988) for more details about this issue. To avoid confusion this author refers to the 
inverse of cost elasticity as the “economies of size” rather than economies of scale (see page 72).  
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model is estimated by Maximum Likelihood and the inefficiency component is 
estimated from the residuals it it itv uε = +  by the conditional expectation ˆ( )it itE u ε , 
proposed by Jondrow et al. (1982). In this model, the observations of a same company 
are considered as independent sample points. Therefore, the panel structure of the data 
is completely ignored. This issue can be addressed by considering a random effects 
model (model II) as in Pitt and Lee (1981). Similar to model I, a normal-half-normal 
composite error term is considered. The difference is that here, the observations for a 
specific company possess a common error component. This model can be formulated 
as: 
 0
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The model is estimated by Maximum Likelihood method. The firm-specific 
inefficiency is estimated using the conditional mean of the inefficiency term (ui) 
proposed by Jondrow et al. (1982),11 that is: 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆE , ,.., Ei i i iT i iu uε ε ε ε   =    , where 
it i itu vε = +  and 
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A limitation of this model is the assumption that the firm-specific stochastic 
term is assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. In fact, most 
frontier models assume that inefficiency is uncorrelated with explanatory variables 
included in the cost function.12 However, the firm-specific term (ui in this model) may 
also contain other unobserved environmental factors, which may be correlated with 
explanatory variables and thus may bias the coefficients. For example, larger 
networks are likely to be more spread, thus incur higher coordination and 
                                                 
11 See also Greene (2002a). 
12 This assumption can be justified based on the fact that the apparent excess costs that are correlated 
with exogenous variables may be due to factors beyond the firm’s control. 
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maintenance costs. In this case as the overall spread of the network is not observed, its 
positive correlation with the network’s size may create an upward bias in the 
coefficient of the network’s size. . 
The fixed effects model (model III) can overcome this heterogeneity bias 
problem, by taking the firm-specific effects as constants. In this model the estimated 
coefficients are unbiased even in the presence of such correlations. The inefficiency 
estimates are obtained using the procedure proposed by Schmidt and Sickles (1984). 
This model is given by: 
 0ln ,it it iTC v uα= + + +itx' β  (7) 
where 2itv  (0, )viid σ∼ , and 0i iu α α= − . Τhe firm-specific αi’s are the so-called fixed 
effects.13 The model can therefore be re-written as:  
 ln .it i itTC vα= + +itx' β  (8) 
This model is estimated by applying Ordinary Least Squares. The positive 
inefficiency scores are then calculated as ˆ ˆ ˆmin( )i i iiu α α= − . From this expression, it 
can be seen that the company with the smallest firm-specific component is regarded 
as fully efficient and defines the common intercept: 0ˆ ˆmin( )iiα α= . 
Finally, Greene’s true random effects model (model IV) is an extension of 
Aigner et al.’s frontier model that includes an additional time-invariant random term 
to capture the firm-specific heterogeneity effect on cost by a random intercept 
component. It can be written as: 
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13 See Hsiao (2003) for details.  
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As before, all distributions are assumed do be independent from each other and from 
the regressors. This model is estimated using Simulated Maximum Likelihood 
method.14 The inefficiency is estimated using the conditional mean of the inefficiency 
term (uit) given by ˆE it itu ω   , where it i itω α ε= + .15  
Aigner et al.’s model (model I) is formulated as a cross sectional model and 
thus, ignores the panel aspects of the data. This might lead to inaccurate results due to 
misspecification by ignoring firm-specific unobserved factors. In the true random 
effects model (model IV), this problem is addressed by including a separate stochastic 
term for firm-specific heterogeneity. Such heterogeneity is also accounted in the fixed 
and random effects models (models II and III). However, both these models impose 
additional restrictions that might affect the inefficiency estimates. In fact in both 
models, the firm-specific unobserved effects are interpreted as efficiency differences. 
Moreover, inefficiency is assumed to be constant over time. Both these assumptions 
might be quite restrictive. Given that in network industries, a considerable part of the 
unobserved factors are related to the network complexity and are beyond the firm’s 
control, thus cannot be considered as firm’s inefficiency. As the time-invariant part of 
unobserved heterogeneity is primarily captured by the firm-specific effects, the 
inefficiency estimates are likely to be biased in these models. As for the second 
assumption, both economic theory and empirical evidence suggest that cost-
inefficiency varies with time. New technology shocks and learning are among the 
reasons why inefficiency varies over time and across individuals. Using a translog 
production function, Alvarez, Arias and Greene (2003) have shown that even in cases 
                                                 
14 See Greene (2001, 2005) for a discussion of the estimation method. For the simulation, 100 Halton 
draws were used. Our estimations with higher numbers of draws showed that the results are not 
sensitive to the number of draws.   
15 See Greene (2002a) for more details. 
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when the management’s efficiency is constant, the technical efficiency could vary 
with time.16 Moreover, the assumption of time-invariant inefficiencies is not realistic 
in a relatively long panel such as our sample.   
The true random effects model does not require any of these assumptions. 
However, if the firm-specific heterogeneity is correlated with the explanatory 
variables, the estimated parameters of the cost function might be biased. In another 
paper (Farsi, Filippini and Kuenzle, 2003), we proposed an adjustment based on 
Mundlak (1978)’s formulation to reduce the possible biases in this model.17 However, 
in the present study, our analysis (not reported here) indicates that the estimation 
results are fairly close with or without this adjustment. Thus, we decided to focus on 
the model without adjustment. With two heterogeneity terms, this model is expected 
to provide a better distinction between inefficiency and other unexplained variations. 
This advantage is especially important in network industries, in which a significant 
part of unobserved differences is due to time-invariant factors.  
In our comparative analysis we consider two aspects of the models’ 
performance. The first dimension is the estimation of the cost function’s coefficients. 
In cases such as bus companies (or in general network industries), explanatory 
variables and costs can be influenced by a number of unobserved network 
characteristics. For instance, increasing density of stops will increase the costs due to 
higher infrastructure expenditures, or a ramified network will lead to a higher labor 
and capital demand than a single-line network. But longer networks might be 
relatively more complex, in which case complexity is an unobserved factor that is 
correlated with the network length. A Hausman test is used to confirm that the firm-
                                                 
16 In translog form this time variation is due to interaction of time-invariant inefficiency with 
explanatory variables. 
17 See also Farsi, Filippini and Greene (2004) for an application of this method in railway companies.  
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specific effects are correlated with the explanatory variables.18 In this case a fixed 
effects estimator would be unbiased and could thus be used as a benchmark. 
Therefore, the extent of heterogeneity bias across different models can be compared 
according to the overall distance of their parameter estimates with respect to those of 
the fixed effects model.   
One can argue that models with more general error structures, such as model 
IV, have lower biases because the residuals can capture a larger part of the 
correlations between unobserved heterogeneity and explanatory variables, thus 
leaving the coefficients less affected. However, the residuals are by definition 
uncorrelated with explanatory variables and the extent to which they may confound 
such correlations with errors may significantly vary from one sample to another. 
Especially, since the frontier estimators are non-linear, the prediction of the biases is 
not straightforward. This theoretical discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Here we rather focus on the evaluation of the models with respect to our sample.  
The second aspect of the models’ performance concerns the estimation of 
inefficiency scores. The specification of inefficiency in each model relies on certain 
assumptions on its error components, which do not violate the consistency of 
estimated parameters. Therefore, an unbiased estimation of the cost function is not a 
sufficient condition for a reliable estimation of inefficiency.19 Given that the “real” 
inefficiency scores are not known, a high correlation between the inefficiency 
estimates from different models is usually considered as an indication of the validity 
of individual approaches. However, as we will see, our results show a rather weak 
                                                 
18 This test  performed on a GLS random effects model (not reported here), rejects the hypothesis of 
nocorrelation between regressors and firm effects.  
19 See Farsi and Filippini (2004) for an example of overestimation of inefficiency in the fixed-effects 
model, which in principle gives unbiased estimates of cost function’s coefficients. 
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correlation. Therefore, our assessment of various models relies on plausibility 
arguments.  
In particular, the purpose of this paper is to study whether the true random 
effect model can help solve some of the mentioned problems. It should be noted that 
the validity of the results depends on the study sample and may vary from one case to 
another. Therefore, our purpose is not to identify a unique all-purpose model. Rather, 
our comparative analysis highlights in each one of the models, the effect of 
unobserved heterogeneity on inefficiency estimates.  
 
4. Data 
 
The data used in this paper are extracted from the annual reports of the Swiss 
Federal Office of Statistics on public transport companies. The companies operating 
in main urban centers are excluded from the sample. Most of these companies operate 
both inner-city tramways and buses, whose functioning is quite different from rural 
bus transport. Our data set includes information on all the 170 rural companies 
operating in Switzerland during the study period. However, the data is not available 
for all years. In several cases lack of information is due to closure or merging with 
other companies. We decided to exclude the companies that have fewer than four 
observations.20 That is, all the companies in the final sample have at least four years 
of non-missing data. Therefore companies that were closed or taken over by other 
companies after a short period of operation are excluded. Obviously, such companies 
are not comparable with other companies because their closure may have been related 
                                                 
20 We also dropped one observation that we suspected as erroneous because of extremely low reported 
total costs compared to the same company’s total costs reported in other years.  
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to their excessive costs or other peculiar reasons. Moreover, since the panel models 
used in this study require in one way or another the estimation of firm-specific effects, 
four observations per firm appears to be a reasonable minimum. We also excluded 
Swiss Post21 and all its sub-contractors from the sample, because a considerable part 
of these companies’ revenues is related to package transport and other postal services. 
Therefore, all the companies included in the sample are mainly involved in passenger 
transport.  
The final data set is an unbalanced panel with 985 observations including 94 
operators over a 12-year period from 1986 to 1997. The number of periods per firm 
varies from 4 to 12 with an average of 10.5 years. The available information includes 
total costs, total number of employees, network length, total numbers of bus-
kilometers and passenger-kilometers as well as those of buses and seats. Table 1 
provides a descriptive summary of the main variables used in the analysis. 
The variables for the cost function specification were calculated as follows. 
Total costs TC are calculated as the total expenditures of the bus companies in a given 
year. The output Y is measured by the number of seat-kilometers, which is calculated 
by multiplying the total number of bus-kilometers in any given year by the average 
number of seats per bus in that year. It should be pointed out that this calculation is 
based on the assumption that the number of seats in a bus does not vary considerably 
in a given company’s fleet in a given year. This is a reasonable assumption because a 
typical bus company in Switzerland possesses a uniform fleet. Generally, in order to 
reduce their maintenance costs, companies purchase their vehicles in large quantities 
from the same supplier and the same model. The number of seats includes both sitting 
and standing places. In other studies such as Windle (1988), Bhattacharyya et al. 
                                                 
21 Swiss Post, a public company funded by the federal government, mainly in charge of mail delivery 
and financial services, operates public transport in about 60% of Switzerland’s rural bus network. 
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(1995) and Jha and Singh (2001), the number of passenger-kilometers is used as 
output. However, since in Switzerland the rural buses are rarely running at full 
capacity and they have to run according to the frequency set by the regulators, a 
considerable number of seats are likely to be empty in a typical bus travel during an 
off-season period. Therefore, the number of passenger-kilometers is not a 
representative measure of output. Alternatively, several authors like Berechman 
(1987), Matas and Raymond (1998) and Fazioli et al. (2003), use bus-kilometers as 
the output measure. Given that the average vehicle size is likely to vary across 
different bus companies in our sample, this measure can distort the output in favor of 
companies with smaller thus less costly buses. The number of seat-kilometers 
measures the kilometers traveled by the fleet capacity, which is not sensitive to 
occupancy rate and at the same time account for the variation of vehicle size across 
companies. In Switzerland the minimum required frequency of bus services (set by 
the communities) does not considerably change with the actual occupancy rates. 
Especially in remote areas, it is not unusual that buses occasionally run with few 
passengers. Therefore, we contend that in the context of Switzerland’s rural bus 
systems, this measure is more relevant for cost estimations.22  
 
 
                                                 
22 In any case, the three mentioned output measures are highly correlated in our data and our 
preliminary estimations suggest that the results are similar regardless of the adopted measure. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics based on 985 observations 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation 1. Quartile Median 3. Quartile 
Total annual costs (TC) 
Thousand CHF 3106 4802 425 1270 3410 
Output (Y) 
Thousand seat-kilometers 47986 85556 5715 16403 53127 
Network length (N) km 43 70 13 26 55 
Capital price (PC) CHF/Seat 1343 606 927 1225 1612 
Labor price (PL)  
CHF per employee per year 80749 27133 66417 80872 91586 
Number of seats 1067 1721 184 439 1215 
Number of employees 22 35 3 9 23 
- All monetary values are in 1997 Swiss Francs (CHF), adjusted for inflation using Switzerland’s 
consumer price index. 
 
Input prices are defined as factor expenditures per factor unit. Labor price (PL) 
is defined as the ratio of annual labor costs to the total number of employees.23 
Following Friedlaender and Chang (1983), the capital price (PC) is calculated as 
residual cost divided by the total number of seats (both standing and sitting), where 
residual cost is total cost minus labor cost.24 Unfortunately, we do not have the 
required data to calculate the capital stock using the capital inventory method. The use 
of a simple indicator is justified by the fact that the bus companies do not possess a 
significant stock of capital apart from the rolling stock, which could be considered as 
a relatively uniform stock. All the costs and prices are adjusted for inflation using the 
Switzerland’s consumer price index and are measured in 1997 Swiss Francs. The 
network length is also included in the explanatory variables as an output 
characteristic. It is expected that due to organization and coordination problems, all 
                                                 
23 Given the range of variation of salaries in the data we can safely assume that a large majority of the 
employees in our sample are full-time.  
24 See also Filippini and Prioni (2003) for a similar approach. 
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other factors being constant, longer networks are expected to be more costly. Other 
output characteristics such as the number of stops per kilometer of network were 
initially considered. However, given that these variables and some of their 
interactions proved to be highly correlated with other explanatory variables, we 
decided to exclude them from the equation to avoid the possibility of multi-
collinearity.25  
 
5. Estimation Results 
 
The estimation results for the four models are given in table 2. These results 
show that the output and input price coefficients are positive and highly significant 
across all models. The estimated coefficient of output from the pooled model (I) is 
particularly different from those of other models. Noting that model I completely 
ignores the panel structure of the data, its estimates are likely to be biased through 
omitted firm-specific factors.  
Since total costs and all the continuous explanatory variables are in logarithms 
and normalized by their medians, the estimated first order coefficients can be 
interpreted as cost elasticities evaluated at the sample median. For instance, the output 
coefficients suggest that on average a one percent increase in seat-kilometers will 
increase the costs by about 0.25 to 0.73 percent depending on the adopted 
specification. The cost elasticity of the network length is as expected positive (αN) 
and significant. This implies that the increase in network length will increase total 
                                                 
25 We only dropped the variables that had extremely high correlation with other variables (the 
correlation coefficient of about 0.99). The omission of these variables would not significantly bias the 
results, because their effects are captured by other variables. However, including such variables creates 
a near-singularity problem, which might cause high estimation errors.  
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costs. This result is consistent with previous empirical studies such as Filippini and 
Prioni (1994, 2003) and Windle (1988).26  
The median cost elasticity with respect to the factor price is positive and of 
similar magnitude in all models. The estimated coefficient for capital price (αPC) 
represents the share of costs attributed to capital at the median production unit, which 
varies from 51 to 54 percent depending on the model. This result is more or less 
consistent with the actual data that show a capital share of about half for the sample 
median. Additionally, the estimated cost function is concave27 in input prices 
suggesting that the companies have a cost-minimizing behavior in response to 
changes in prices.  
The coefficient of the linear time trend is significant and positive in all models 
except in model I, which shows an insignificant effect. These results suggest an 
annual increase of about 1% in total costs. This result can be explained by the fact that 
the production technology has not much changed in bus transport. The increase in 
costs may be related to higher quality of service and increased security requirements.  
Although the Hausman specification test’s results suggest that the firm 
specific effects in a GLS model are correlated with the regressors, the results in table 
2 indicate that most of the coefficients do not vary considerably across models II, III 
and IV. In particular the estimated coefficients of model IV are within a reasonable 
range of the unbiased estimates of the fixed effects model. Several likelihood ratio 
tests28 were performed to test whether the cost function coefficients are similar across 
models. As expected model I, that ignores the panel structure of the data, is 
                                                 
26 It should be noted that Filippini and Prioni (2003) studied the Swiss bus systems though using a 
different sample in a shorter time period and without cost frontier models.  
27 In this context the concavity condition reduces to αPCPC≤0. 
28 In the case of true random effects model, as the likelihood function is simulated, a Wald test was 
used instead. Note that the two tests are asymptotically equivalent.  
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significantly different from all other models. These tests also suggest statistically 
significant differences across the other three models. However, these differences are 
mainly limited to the output coefficient (αY). In fact, a test on the similarity of all 
other coefficients was not rejected at p=.05, suggesting that apart from the output 
coefficient the estimated cost function is similar across these three models.  
 
Table 2: Regression results 
Coefficient Model I 
Pooled 
Model II 
RE (ML) 
Model III 
FE 
Model IV 
True RE 
αY 0.734* 
(0.013) 
0.326* 
(0.040) 
0.247* 
(0.024) 
0.351* 
(0.009) 
αN 0.122* 
(0.019) 
0.244* 
(0.023) 
0.240* 
(0.033) 
0.264* 
(0.018) 
αPC 0.512* 
(0.025) 
0.535* 
(0.008) 
0.540* 
(0.015) 
0.525* 
(0.006) 
αYY 0.079* 
(0.018) 
-0.027* 
(0.009) 
-0.010 
(0.018) 
0.014* 
(0.004) 
αNN 0.083* 
(0.042) 
0.063 
(0.054) 
0.027 
(0.064) 
0.119* 
(0.016) 
αPCPC -0.162* 
(0.041) 
-0.262* 
(0.015) 
-0.264* 
(0.025) 
-0.278* 
(0.013) 
αYN 0.003 
(0.026) 
-0.026 
(0.023) 
-0.026 
(0.032) 
-0.094* 
(0.010) 
αYPC -0.067* 
(0.029) 
-0.095* 
(0.009) 
-0.098* 
(0.016) 
-0.115* 
(0.006) 
αNPC 0.129* 
(0.042) 
0.093* 
(0.011) 
0.102* 
(0.024) 
0.116* 
(0.008) 
αT -0.005 
(0.003) 
0.011* 
(0.001) 
0.015* 
(0.002) 
0.010* 
(0.001) 
α0 -0.275* 
(0.030) 
-1.085* 
(0.040) 
-1.458*  
(0.108) 
0.054* 
(0.011) 
σα - - - 0.526* (0.011) 
2 2
u vσ σ σ= +  0.433* 
(0.0004) 
1.306* 
(0.387) - 
0.163* 
(0.002) 
u vλ σ σ=  1.038* 
(0.090) 
9.738* 
(3.464) - 
0.980* 
(0.034) 
- Standard errors are given in brackets. * means significantly different from zero at least at 5%. 
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Table 3 provides a descriptive summary of the inefficiency estimates from 
different models. These estimates represent the relative excess cost of a given firm 
compared to a minimum level that would have been achieved if the firm had operated 
as efficiently as the ‘best practice’ observed in the sample, since mln ln itit itu TC TC= − , 
were m itTC  are the predicted costs of the regression model, including the random error 
term vit.29 In comparing different models it should again be stressed that models II and 
III assume constant inefficiency over time. Moreover, in these models all the 
unobserved firm-specific differences are interpreted as inefficiency. As expected, 
model II and III predict rather implausible inefficiency scores averaging about 1.15 
and 1.46. At their face values these numbers suggest an excess cost of more than 100 
percent for a typical company. These high values indicate that the heterogeneity 
across companies is an important driver of cost differences and that neglecting it may 
create a substantial upward bias in inefficiency scores.  
In model I the inefficiency estimates are in a more realistic range, with an 
average of 0.25 and a maximum value of 0.73. These values, though still arguably 
quite high, are substantially lower than those predicted by models II and III. However, 
the inefficiency scores obtained from model I are likely to be overestimated, because 
in fact they might capture some of the network-specific unobserved heterogeneity, 
which is not accounted for separately. Model IV, which has two separate stochastic 
terms for inefficiency and firm-specific heterogeneity, has inefficiency estimates of 
about 0.09 on average, which stands for a cost saving potential of about 9 percent.30 
Although the maximum value of 0.47 appears as excessive, this model’s results 
                                                 
29 Note that cost efficiency can be alternatively defined as the optimal costs divided by actual costs that 
is, CE = exp(-u), where u is the relative excess cost given in table 3. 
30 This result is consistent with the average inefficiency levels reported in Dalen and Gomez-Lobo 
(2003) for the Norwegian bus industry. 
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suggest that in 95 percent of the cases the relative excessive cost is below 15 percent. 
The high value of estimated inefficiency in the remaining 5 percent can be explained 
by statistical errors. Therefore, compared to the other models the inefficiency 
estimates from model IV are plausible and remain within a reasonable range of 
variation. 
 
Table 3: Inefficiency measures 
 
Model I 
Pooled 
Model II 
RE (ML) 
Model III 
FE 
Model IV 
True RE 
Mean 0.249 1.147 1.457 0.090 
Median 0.228 1.070 1.408 0.082 
Maximum 0.732 2.825 3.383 0.473 
95th Percentile 0.472 2.316 2.854 0.153 
Minimum 0.042 0.031 0 0.019 
 
 
The pair-wise correlation coefficients between the inefficiency estimates from 
different models are listed in table 4. In order for the correlation coefficients to be 
comparable, they are calculated at the firm level using 94 observations (one 
observation for each firm). Namely, in models with time-variant efficiency, the 
inefficiency score is calculated as the firm’s average inefficiency score over the 
sample period. For models with time-variant inefficiency the correlation coefficients 
are also given over the total of 985 observations. As expected, in most cases the 
correlation coefficients are rather low, suggesting substantial differences across 
models. Some of these differences can be explained by large sampling errors incurred 
for the estimation of inefficiency for individual companies, especially in cases where 
the inefficiency can vary with time. This problem for cross-sectional data and short 
panels is documented by Horrace and Schmidt (1996), Street (2003) and Jensen 
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(2000). Obviously, to the extent that inefficiencies remain constant over time, a longer 
panel can help. Nevertheless, the assumption of constant inefficiency can be 
unrealistic in long panels. 
However, the weak correlation between efficiency estimates across different 
models suggests that these models differ not only with respect to individual 
companies’ inefficiency scores but also give significantly different efficiency 
rankings.31 In particular, model IV shows a negative correlation with models II and III 
and a weak positive correlation with model I.32  Such weak correlation implies that the 
individual companies might get completely different evaluations depending on the 
adopted model. To the extent that model IV is a legitimate model that separates 
unobserved heterogeneity from inefficiency, these results suggest that other models 
might give a misleading assessment of individual companies. For instance, our 
estimations show that the company regarded as fully efficient in the fixed effects 
model (model III), is a company that operates in a relatively short network with a 
single line. However, this company’s relatively low costs might be related to its 
simple network, rather than high efficiency. This explanation is consistent with the 
results of the true random effects model (model IV) that ranks the same company as 
highly inefficient.33  
As table 4 shows, the high correlation between inefficiency estimates from 
models II and III (coefficient of .987) is a striking exception to the rule. This result 
can be explained by the fact that the inefficiency estimates in both models mainly 
represent the network-specific heterogeneity. Therefore, the high correlation between 
                                                 
31 The rank correlations show a pattern similar to table 4. These results are omitted to avoid repetition. 
32 All three coefficients are significantly different from zero at 5% significance level. 
33 Model IV suggests that with an inefficiency score of about 10%, this company is less efficient than 
the average company in the sample. 
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these two models can only suggest that the estimation of unobserved network effects 
is not much sensitive to whether fixed or random effects specification is used.  
 
Table 4. Pair-wise Pearson correlation between inefficiency estimates 
 
Model I 
Pooled 
Model II 
RE (ML) 
Model III 
FE 
Model IV 
True RE 
Model l 1    
Model II 0.496 1   
Model III 0.426 0.987 1  
Model IV 0.083 (0.371) -0.082 -0.098 1 
 
- The correlation coefficients have been estimated over the firms (94 observations). 
- Correlation coefficient based on 985 observations is given in brackets. 
 
To further test whether the inefficiency estimates differ across various models 
a series of t-tests have been performed. The results unequivocally reject the 
hypothesis that the inefficiency estimates across any pair of models are on average 
identical. Table 5 shows the estimates of scale and density economies as given in 
equations (3) and (4), obtained from different models. The results are listed for three 
representative companies at the first quartile, median and the third quartile outputs. 
We identified the median (1st/3rd quartile) company as the company that produces the 
sample median (1st/3rd quartile) of the number of seat-kilometers and considered that 
company’s corresponding network length in the estimation of density and scale 
economies.34 Since the factor prices are assumed to be exogenous, they are held 
constant at their median values for all three cases.  
                                                 
34 We considered alternative definitions for representative companies, e.g. median of both output and 
network. However, the results are mainly the same insofar as the following discussion is concerned.   
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Table 5. Economies of scale and density estimates  
 
Model I 
Pooled 
Model II 
RE 
Model III 
FE 
Model IV 
True RE 
ED at 1st Quartile  1.545 2.592 3.468 2.224 
ED at Median 1.370 2.780 3.571 2.115 
ED at 3rd Quartile 1.208 3.544 4.485 3.086 
ES at 1st Quartile 1.500 1.719 1.910 1.490 
ES at Median 1.343 1.915 2.059 1.713 
ES at 3rd Quartile 1.008 1.907 2.248 1.879 
 
The results listed in table 5 show a considerable amount of variation between 
different models. As can be seen in this table, both economies of density and scale are 
greater than one in all three representative cases, suggesting the presence of 
unexploited economies in most companies in the sample.35 In particular, the relatively 
high values of density economies indicate that a more intensive use of a given 
network would considerably lower the average cost per seat-kilometer. However, it 
should be noted that the intensity of demand in a given network is beyond the 
company’s control. An increase in output usually requires some extension in the 
network, which can be represented by scale economies.  
The estimated scale economies from all models also suggest the existence of 
considerable potential for cost saving through extending the networks. As expected, 
the economies obtained from an increase in output density in a given network (density 
economies) are relatively higher than those gained by extending a company’s network 
(scale economies). The presence of unexploited scale economies in all three 
                                                 
35 Only the estimated value of economies of scale for the third quartile for the pooled model is not 
significantly different from one. 
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representative cases suggests that most companies are smaller than the cost-
minimizing size at which such economies are fully utilized. The small size of rural 
bus companies in Switzerland is related to the development of this industry that has 
been historically associated with the growth of small and fragmented user 
communities.  
The high variation of scale and density economies across various models (see 
table 5) can be partially explained by the models’ differences with respect to the 
unobserved network effects. If these effects are correlated with explanatory variables 
(such as output and network length) the values obtained from the fixed effect model 
(model III) are unbiased and those of the other three models are biased. Particularly, 
the values estimated by the pooled model (model I) are likely to be biased downward. 
This model’s estimates are comparable to those reported by Filippini and Prioni 
(2003), who applied a cross-sectional cost-frontier model to a panel data of 34 bus 
companies in Switzerland. In one of their specifications, the median company’s size 
(about twice as our sample median) has been found to be very close to the cost-
minimizing size. These results suggest that ignoring the unobserved firm-specific 
effects can bias the estimated coefficients. In fact such biases are driven by possible 
correlation of unobserved effects with output and network length. For instance it is 
plausible that larger networks are more complex in terms of unobserved factors, thus 
more costly. Such correlations are likely to be positive, thus lead to an 
underestimation of scale economies.  
Theoretically, an unbiased estimation of scale and density economies can be 
obtained from the fixed effect model (III), because it allows with the regressors 
correlated firm specific effects. If such correlation is present and positive, then the 
coefficients of model II and IV are biased upwards. However, because of the large 
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number of parameters in this model (at least as many as the companies in the sample), 
the precision of the results depends on the number of periods in the sample and the 
companies’ output variation over the sample period. As indicated in table 2, the 
coefficients of most of the second order terms are statistically insignificant in this 
model. This can be explained by the relatively high standard errors in the fixed effects 
model. Therefore, estimated economies of scale and density for the fixed effects 
model might be imprecise. 
Interestingly, model I predicts a decreasing scale and density economies with 
output, which appears to be consistent with the common perception that sources of 
scale economies are exhaustible. However, models II to IV suggest that if the 
unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account, this result may be reversed. As table 5 
shows, according to these models, the unexploited scale and density economies are 
greater in relatively large companies in the sample. This result can be explained by 
some of the special features in relatively small network industries: Noting that the 
smallest companies in our sample are bus companies with a single line and a few 
employees, the potential gains of increasing the size are limited to savings in 
distributing the same fixed costs over a higher output. On the other hand, large 
companies have complex multiple-line networks. By increasing their size, such 
companies can benefit not only from savings in the fixed costs but also from a better 
possibility of reallocation of input factors over the network, thus reducing their 
variable costs.  
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6. Conclusions 
 
The application of alternative cost frontier models to a panel of rural bus 
companies in Switzerland indicates that the inefficiency estimates are sensitive to the 
adopted model. From a methodological point of view, the results largely depend upon 
how the unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity among firms is modeled. Our 
comparative analysis suggests that models that do not distinguish between unobserved 
network effects and inefficiency can overestimate the inefficiency scores. In 
particular, if the inefficiency estimates are derived from the firm-specific effects (cf. 
Schmidt and Sickles, 1984 and Pitt and Lee, 1981), they include an important part of 
the unobserved exogenous factors related to the network. Our sample shows that such 
factors can account for a considerable part of cost differences, thus bias the 
inefficiency estimates to implausibly high values.  
This paper also highlights possible differences in cost function coefficients 
across models. A (pooled) cross-sectional model does not account for network 
heterogeneity. Since such heterogeneity is likely to be correlated with some of the 
explanatory variable, this model can give biased coefficients. A fixed effect model 
can solve the heterogeneity bias in the coefficients. However, because of the large 
number of parameters (incidental parameters problem), this model might lead to 
relatively large estimation errors especially for the second-order terms of the cost 
function. These latter coefficients might be important for the estimation of scale and 
density economies.  
This study suggests that an econometric specification that includes separate 
stochastic terms for firm-specific effects and inefficiency can improve the estimations 
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regarding both inefficiencies and slopes. We considered a random-constant cost 
frontier model (“true” random effects model) proposed by Greene (2004, 2005). The 
results indicate that the main coefficients of the cost function are fairly close to the 
unbiased estimators obtained from the fixed effects model. Given that we do not have 
the true values of efficiency, we cannot conclude the validity of any model regarding 
inefficiency estimates. However, our analysis suggests that while conventional 
models could give implausible estimates, the true random effects model’s estimates 
are within a reasonable range. These results underscore the importance of modeling 
unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity in efficiency measurement of network 
industries. 
The results also indicate that the unexploited scale economies might be greater 
for relatively large companies, which can benefit from better possibilities of 
reallocation over larger networks. Such effects could be masked by unobserved 
network factors, which if neglected could lead to inaccurate results. It should be 
pointed out that the results of this paper are valid for the specific sample used here 
and cannot be directly extended to other cases.  
From a policy point of view, this study suggests that the “true” random effects 
model could be a valuable alternative for setting a benchmark in regulating network 
industries. However, it has to be emphasized that a mechanical use of any of these 
models in regulation could be misleading. Since each industry has its specific cost 
characteristics that are not equally well reproduced by these models, establishing a 
reliable benchmark requires a careful analysis of the cost structure of the industry 
under consideration. Consequently, these models should be used as one among 
different instruments in the assessment of subsidy requests.  
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